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Abstract
The conventional wisdom in the literature on capital controls and growth argues that capital
controls increase the ability of a government to tax capitalists which proves detrimental for growth.
To address this issue, we construct an OLG model to study the eﬀect of capital controls on human
capital investments and the incidence of redistributive taxation in a growing economy. We argue
to the contrary: i.e., the conventional wisdowm linking higher capital controls to lower growth is
reproduced only when an economy is suﬃciently developed. For under-developed countries, higher
capital controls can induce balanced growth, and the wisdom does not apply. When the model is
augmented with a subsistence sector, we show that if workers are suﬃciently poor, then workers do
not invest in human capital. Hence, a modern sector does not exist. Higher capital controls however
makes it feasible for a modern sector to exist by lowering the threshold income level required by
workers to invest in human capital. Our results are consistent with recent evidence which show
that, while ﬁnancial liberalizations are associated with signiﬁcant increases in growth, the eﬀect
is larger for countries with high education levels. Our results are also consistent with empirical
evidence that argues that liberalizing the capital account positively aﬀects growth only after a
country has achieved a certain degree of economic development.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: F21, D33, E62, O19, O40.
Keywords: Capital Flight, Economic Growth, Human Capital, Income Distribution, Interna-
tional Linkages to Development, Long Term Capital Movements, Optimal Taxation.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Capital ﬂight — from poor to rich countries - plagues many developing economies. In particular, capital
ﬂight tends to more pronounced in countries mired in poverty traps with relative large inequalities
∗This paper has beneﬁtted from comments at the 2005 Meetings of the Association of Public Economic Theory
Conference in Marseilles, the 2005 ACE Meetings in Melbourne, the Fifth (2005) Model and Methods Conference at ISI -
Kolkata, and departmental seminars at the University of Sydney, the University of New South Wales, and JNU - Delhi.
We would like to thank Lutz Hendricks, Laura Alfaro and Peter Rangazas for useful comments. Debajyoti Chakrabarty
would like to acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the University of Sydney SESQUI Grant No. U3139.
†Corresponding Author: Chetan Ghate, Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute - Delhi Center, 7 S.J.S Sansanwal
Marg, New Delhi - 110016, India. Tel: 91-11-4149-3938. Fax: 91-11-4149-3981. E-mail: cghate@isid.ac.in.and low human capital investments. Collier et al. (2004) present evidence on capital ﬂight for 30
under-developed countries over 1980-1998 and ﬁnd that the average country in this sample has a ﬂight
r a t i oo f1 3% . 1 Collier et al. (2004) show that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest capital
ﬂight ratios with 35% of private wealth held abroad. In comparison, average capital ﬂight ratios in
Latin American and South Asia are less but still signiﬁcant (around 10 % of private wealth). Further,
Collier et al. (2001) ﬁnd that in the regions around the world where capital ﬂight is most severe,
capital ﬂight can lead to a major reduction in the real capital stock per worker leading to adverse
eﬀects on long run economic performance.2
Despite capital ﬂight being widespread in under-developed countries, this phenomenon has received
little attention in the political economy of growth literature. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. In
particular, we explore the long term growth implications of physical capital ﬂight by examining how
1) capital ﬂight aﬀects the incidence of redistributive taxation, and 2) how capital ﬂight aﬀects human
capital investments. Our contribution to the literature is to examine capital ﬂight in a growth model
with two factors of production: physical capital and human capital. To date, most of the literature
has focussed on the impact of capital ﬂight on a single accumulable factor - physical capital. We
argue that the conventional wisdom — linking higher capital controls to lower growth — is reproduced
only when an economy is suﬃciently developed. For under-developed economies, capital controls can
induce balanced growth. Therefore, for under-developed countries, the conventional wisdom linking
higher capital controls to lower growth does not apply.
To capture the main elements of the interplay between capital ﬂight, redistribution and growth,
we model an OLG economy populated by dynastic agents who have access either to physical capital or
human capital. Owners of physical capital have two alternative investment possibilities - investing at
home or abroad. Investments abroad provide a secur er e t u r nw h i l ei n v e s t m e n t sa th o m ea r es u b j e c tt o
redistributive taxation through a tax on capital income. We examine the optimal degree of taxation
under these circumstances and the optimal degree of capital ﬂight. Later, we augment the model by
1Collier et al. (2004) deﬁne capital ﬂight as the ratio of the stock of ﬂight capital to the stock of private
wealth.Outwards capital ﬂows are computed using the residual method and augmented with measures of export under-
invoicing and import over-invoicing.
2Capital outﬂows from poor to rich countries is consistent with a neo-classical framework. For instance, Caselli and
Feyrer (2005) argue that once the returns to capital are appropriately measured, current capital allocations across the
world are already near their optimal levels. Any further reallocation from developed economies to developing economies
only leads to minor and concentrated output gains. This suggests that if one adds restrictions to capital ﬂows and risk
factors, then capital should ﬂow from poorer to richer countries, as the world capital return will exceed the domestic
return in a developing economy.
2allowing workers to invest in human capital as well as in subsistence production. We show that if
the income of workers is suﬃciently low, the entire endowment of workers is invested in subsistence
production, and none in human capital. As a result, the capitalists invest their entire endowment
abroad. This implies that the modern sector in the economy does not exist. We then derive a
threshold on worker endowments above which a modern sector exists, and below which, workers simply
invest in the subsistence sector. We characterize the optimal tax rates under subsistence production.
Importantly, we show that as worker income grows over time, the subsistence sector vanishes, and the
growth rate of human capital converges to the model without subsistence production.
The conventional wisdom in this literature says that reducing capital controls will curb the ability
of the government to tax capitalists and therefore prove beneﬁcial for growth. We argue that it is
indeed true but only when an economy is suﬃciently developed and is able to sustain a balanced growth
equilibrium in steady state. This result is consistent with a large literature on capital mobility and
economic performance which suggests that an open capital account positively aﬀects growth only after
a country has achieved a certain degree of economic development (Edwards, 2000). When an economy
is underdeveloped and experiencing capital ﬂight, we show that this argument does not apply. Higher
capital controls relax the constraint for the existence of balanced growth in steady state equilibrium.
We also argue that higher capital controls in this environment can prevent excessive capital ﬂight and
help an economy develop its modern sector.
This paper is structured as follows. Next, we brieﬂy discuss the related literature. In section
2, the model is setup and the optimal decisions of the two groups are solved for. The dynamics
are characterized in section 3. Section 4 extends the model to include the possibility of subsistence
production and the emergence of development traps. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our research is motivated by a large corpus of literature studying the association between inequal-
ity and growth. This literature examines the eﬀect of income distribution on economic growth by
examining the impact of redistributive politics on physical capital investment and/or human capi-
tal investment. Extensions of this literature incorporate roles for redistribution, public ﬁnancing of
education, capital market imperfections, and non convexities in technologies. Beginning with Per-
otti (1996), the empirical literature has failed to ﬁnd a robust relationship between inequality and
consequent redistribution despite theoretical models continuing to rely on this link.3 However, these
3For a recent survey of this literature see Glaeser (2005).
3models either tend to assume closed economies (Alesina and Rodrik (1994)) or avoid physical capital
altogether (Saint Paul (1993)). While Galor and Moav (2004) incorporate physical capital and human
capital accumulation in the process of economic growth, their analysis is also based on a closed econ-
omy framework. It does not take much to realize that once one allows the possibility of capital ﬂight,
then even workers who do not earn a return from physical capital will not necessarily want to tax at
high rates since that would encourage further capital ﬂight and reduce their own wages. Therefore
the obvious link between inequality and redistribution breaks down.4 This suggests the extent of
redistribution depends not just on the degree of inequality but also the openness of the economy to
capital ﬂows.
While the literature on the interaction between physical capital and human capital and their eﬀects
on economic growth is large, there are a few papers that are directly related to our work. Galor and
Moav (2004) examine the relative importance of physical capital and human capital at diﬀerent stages
of economic development and looks at implications of inequality on economic growth. They show that
in the initial stages of development, physical capital is more important and therefore inequality is
beneﬁcial. In later stages as human capital becomes more important, inequality is less beneﬁcial. 5
While it is not our attempt here to rewrite the various stages of development after incorporating
capital ﬂight, it is still useful to consider the implications of capital ﬂight on the stages of development.
Our theoretical results suggest that a less developed economy can actually end in either poverty traps
with absolutely no human capital accumulation or even growth traps with sustained increases in
inequality and a declining human capital to physical capital ratio with permanent capital ﬂight. We
ﬁnd that capital controls can be beneﬁcial to under-developed countries for two reasons. First, they
keep the level of domestic investment high (and reduce capital ﬂight) which leads to higher domestic
wages, domestic income, and investment in human capital. Second, the endogenous threshold required
to jump to a balanced growth path is lowered with higher capital controls. This makes it easier for an
under-developed economy to transition to a ‘high’ growth path. However, once on a high growth path,
we show that the eﬀect of capital controls is detrimental to the growth in capital and education. This
4See Mourmouras and Rangazas (2005) for estimates on the extent to which ﬁnancial openness places an upper bound
on domestic taxation for developing countries. Quadrini (2005) ﬁnds that the transition from a regime of capital autarky
to a regime of free mobility leads to a decrease in the long term tax rate on capital of 13 %, leading to a welfare increase
of 1% in European countries. Like Caselli and Freyer (2005), Gournichas and Jeanne (2003) support the consensus view
in the literature that the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening are not large. In Gournichas and Jeanne (2003) however,
the steady state is independent of whether the economy is open or closed. Our framework diﬀers from these papers as
ﬁnancial opening aﬀects both the steady state as well as the transition path.
5Alfaro and Kanzuk (2001) consider an overlapping generations model in which agents vote on whether to open or
close an economy to international capital ﬂows. They derive conditions under which an economy can cycle between open
and closed, which is consistent with economies in an ‘intermediate’ stage of development.
4is consistent with recent evidence in Bekaert et al. (2001) who show that while ﬁnancial liberalizations
are associated with signiﬁcant increases in economic growth, the eﬀect is larger for countries with high
education levels. In particular, Bekaert et al. (2001) show that the coeﬃcient on the liberalization
indicator is three times larger for countries with above median education levels. These results suggest
that policy makers should not expect a signiﬁcant growth impact from ﬁnancial market liberalization
if the country’s education level is lower than the median of the 30 emerging market economies in their
sample (Bekaert et al (2001, p. 492)).
Our work is also related to Bourguignion and Verdier (2000b) and Viaene and Zilcha (2002a,b).
For instance, Bourguignion and Verdier (2000b) examine the willingness of capital owners to fund
public education. Their work, which is a part of a larger literature on the transition from oligarchies
to democracies, examines the impact of capital ﬂight on the public funding of education. While in
a closed economy, oligarchs (who are assumed to be capitalists) may choose to subsidize education,
once the economy opens up to capital ﬂight, the same incentive disappears and hence international
ﬁnancial liberalization is bad for education. In our paper this possibility of a development trap where
there are physical capital outﬂows and zero human capital emerges as a special case. Moreover, we
are more concerned with the incentives of the owners of human capital to redistribute in the presence
of international capital ﬂows. Hence, the two papers are complementary.6
Viaene and Zilcha (2002b) examine the role of government intervention in raising human capital
investments in a two country model. Their work focuses on the issue of competition between govern-
ments in trying to garner a larger share of output and the role of public education spending in the ﬁnal
outcome. However, Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) - which is more closely related to our work - allows for
heterogeneity in income across agents. Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) ﬁnd that capital market integration
does not aﬀect the long run growth rate of an economy (when compared to the autarkic case), and
that capital market integration is always preferred by altruistic households even if later generations
lose and integration reduces income inequality in the country that experiences outﬂows. These results
are diﬀerent from ours. In addition, the theoretical framework in Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) and our
framework is quite diﬀerent: we do not assume public provision of education, while income distribu-
tion in our framework is represented in terms of its functional distribution with diﬀerent groups acting
strategically. In contrast, Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) assume a continuum of agents.
6More recently, Bourguignon and Verdier (2005) use a Ricardo-Viner framework to show that when a small open
economy opens up to trade, the eﬀects on education reduce the wage skill gap and makes education privately less
proﬁt a b l ef o rt h o s ew h oc a na ﬀord it. Trade may also lessen the liquidity constraint of poor unskilled workers which
leads to more investment in human capital being undertaken.
52 The Model
The aggregate production function of the economy in period t is given by
Yt = AKt
γHt
1−γ,( 1 )
where Yt denotes output, Ht and Kt denote the aggregate amounts of human capital and physical
capital respectively, A>0 denotes a technological shift parameter7,a n dγ ∈ (0,1). The economy
consists of two types of agents called capitalists - indexed by K - and workers - indexed by W,o f
equal measure. The capitalists provide physical capital whereas the workers supply the human capital
in the production process.
There are competitive markets for both physical and human capital. The wage rate and rental
rate are
wt =( 1− γ)
Yt
Ht
, (2)
and
rt = γ
Yt
Kt
, (3)
respectively.
In each time period t−1,w h e r et =1 ,2,....∞, a new generation of agents are born who live for two
periods at the end of which they are replaced by an oﬀspring of their type. Each agent is born with
a type of endowment. The capitalists are born with an endowment of capital goods, bK
t . Workers are
born with an endowment, bW
t , which they invest entirely in human capital, et:i . e . ,bW
t = et.H u m a n
capital in period t depends on the level of education according to
Ht = eθ
t−1,( 4 )
where θ ∈ [0,1]. We assume that both workers and capitalists become economically active in the
second period of their life: they only care about second period consumption and make an inter-vivos
transfer to their oﬀspring.8
Workers have the political power to extract rents from the capitalists in the form of a tax on
capital income. In particular, in period t − 1, the workers announce a tax rate, τt, to be imposed on
capital income in period t. Based on the announcement of the tax rate at the end of period t − 1,
7Alternatively one can think of “A” as a parameter which captures the level of development of an economy in terms
of its state of legal institutions or the state of development of its ﬁnancial markets.
8For the rest of the paper we will use the terms, bequests and endowments interchangeably to refer to these transfers.
6the capitalists decide how much of their capital stock to invest at home and abroad.9 Let r denote
the world interest rate where r>1 which the capitalists take as given. We assume that investment
abroad is costly for the capitalists depending on the capital control regime existing in the economy.
For each unit of capital invested abroad, the capitalists get a return of (r − φ). The parameter, φ,
captures in a straightforward way the extent of capital controls in an economy. In particular, φ =0 ,
corresponds to an economy without capital controls, while, φ = r, corresponds to a closed economy.
φ here simply reﬂects a deadweight loss that owners of physical capital need to bear to move their
capital illegally out of the country.10
Our setup implies that the post - tax income of the workers and capitalists is given by
yW
t = wtHt + τtrtKt =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]AK
γ
t H
1−γ
t ,
and
yK
t =( 1− τt)rtKt +( r − φ)(bK
t−1 − Kt) (5)
=( 1− τt)γAK
γ
t H
1−γ
t +( r − φ)(bK
t−1 − Kt),
respectively.
Before we characterize the optimal tax rate under capital ﬂight, we address some of the assumptions
that we have made in this setup: a) the worker-capitalist divide, b) workers choose the tax rate, and
c) the human capital production function.
The worker-capitalist separation is standard in models of distributional conﬂict and growth .
For example, Das and Ghate (2004) use a similar separation to study distributional conﬂict in a
heterogenous agent model of growth and distribution. Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2005) use a
worker-capitalist setup to study the pro-cyclicality of tax policies in emerging markets. Similarly,
Bourguignion and Verdier (2005, 2000a, 2000b) use a worker-capitalist setup to study the timing of
political transitions. Note that in the current framework owners of physical capital are not allowed
to invest in human capital and vice versa. This is not limiting: as long as one group derives income
mainly from capital and another group from human capital, our results are qualitatively similar to a
model in which agents derive income from both factors.11
9Since both workers and capitalists are economically inactive in the ﬁrst period and only active in the second period,
they only vote for second period taxes and not for the ﬁrst period. Thus every generation gets to vote only once. Further,
we abstract from commitment issues.
10This reﬂects our focus on “unrecorded” capital outﬂows. Note that Collier et al (2004) also measure capital ﬂight
as a residual rather than oﬃcial measures of outﬂows.
11An alternate setup might utilize a variant of the existing OLG structure where the young working generation derive
7Secondly, consistent with the growth and distribution literature, we assume that the workers
determine the tax rate in the economy. This assumption is consistent with political economy in
dynamic models in which the median voter — deﬁned as an agent that is poorer than the ‘average
agent’ in terms of income or capital holdings — is the decisive voter. We therefore have in mind an
under-developed economy in which the political parties converge to the preferred policies of the median
voter who is a capital-poor agent.
Our third assumption concerns the human capital production function. In the current setup,
the human capital production function follows Galor and Moav (2004, 2006) in terms of focusing
exclusively on education expenditures. Recently, Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) have shown that if one
incorporates human capital expenditures (i.e., both formal schooling and pre-schooling expenditures
in nutrition, etc.) into human capital stock measurements, then large TFP gaps between countries
disappear.12 We could also incorporate existing human capital into the education production function.
However, what is important is that current investment in human capital be a positive function of
current income. As long as this holds, the model would admit a less primitive form of the production
structure.13
We now characterize the optimal tax rate set by workers and the resulting domestic investment
undertaken by capitalists.
2.1 The Optimal Tax Rate and Capital Flight
The maximization problem faced by a worker born in period t − 1 is given by
maxUW = αlogcW
t +( 1− α)logbW
t , α ∈ (0,1)
subject to cW
t + bW
t ≤ yW
t ,
where cW
t , yW
t denotes the consumption and income of the worker. The optimal decision rules for the
worker are given by
cW
t = αyW
t ,
income from human capital and form one voting group. The elder retired generation derive only interest income and
hence might be viewed as “capitalists” and form another voting group. As long as the younger group has the median
voter (possibly because of positive population growth), similar results would obtain. Alfaro and Kanzuck (2004) use an
OLG setup although though they do not focus on human capital accumulation.
12Earlier studies like Bils and Klenow (2000) and Hall and Jones (1999) focussed on the length of years and not on
the expenditure component.
13We also assume that capital outﬂows are not taxable. Again, this is driven by the empirical observation that capital
ﬂows out to escape taxation. Further making capital outﬂows taxable would make the entire model’s results hinge on
the assumed respective technologies of tax collection- an uninteresting proposition.
8and
bW
t =( 1− α)yW
t .
Log utility implies that workers consume and bequeath a constant proportion of their income.
The capitalists also face a similar maximization problem as the worker. The only diﬀerence with
respect to the workers is that capitalists bequeath an endowment of capital for their oﬀspring (as
opposed to education). A capitalist born in period t − 1 solves the following problem:
maxUK = αlogcK
t +( 1− α)logbK
t , α ∈ (0,1)
subject to cK
t + bK
t ≤ yK
t ,
where cK
t , yK
t denotes the consumption and income of the capitalist. The optimal decision rules for
the capitalists are given by
cK
t = αyK
t ,
and
bK
t =( 1− α)yK
t .
Like the worker, the decision rules imply that capitalists also consume and bequeath a constant
proportion of their income. Note that as far as utility of an agent is concerned, any policy that
maximizes the income of an agent also maximizes her utility. Given any capital income tax rate
imposed by the workers, the capitalist’s behavior is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given any tax rate on capital income and domestic rental rate the capitalist will allocate
investment home or abroad according to the following criterion:
Kt =

 
 
0 if rt(1 − τt) < r − φ
h
(1−τt)γA
r−φ
i 1
1−γ Ht if rt(1 − τt)=r − φ
bK
t−1 if rt(1 − τt) > r − φ
(6)
Proof: The capitalists will allocate their investment home or abroad such that their income is maxi-
mized. Maximizing equation (5) with respect to Kt gives the expression above.
Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal investment rule by capitalists. Given the domestic return to
capital, tax rate, and the world interest rate, the capitalist’s entire endowment is invested abroad if
rt(1 − τt) < r − φ. This implies that there is complete capital ﬂight, and no domestic investment.
If rt(1 − τt)=r − φ, part of the endowment of capitalists is invested abroad and part of it invested
domestically. If rt(1−τt) > r−φ, there is no capital ﬂight, as the domestic after tax return to capital
exceeds the world interest rate.
9Given the capitalist’s decision rule, we can characterize the worker’s optimal tax rate. The marginal
product of capital schedule is shown in Figure 1. At any time period t, the pre-tax rental rate is a
decreasing function of the domestic investment, Kt. The maximum possible domestic investment is
the endowment of the capitalist, bK
t−1. The rental rate of capital at this level of investment is denoted
as b rt. It will turn out later that b rt plays a crucial role in the optimal tax behavior of the workers.
Equations (3) and (4) imply
b rt = γA
Ã
eθ
t−1
bK
t−1
!1−γ
.( 7 )
Note that the entire rt schedule and b rt shifts upwards as the level of human capital increases (see
Figure 1). The next proposition characterizes the optimal tax rate for the workers.
Insert Figure 1 Here.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the workers set a tax rate such that the capitalist is indiﬀerent between
investing at home or abroad. The optimal tax rate is given by:
τt =
½
0 if b rt ≤ r − φ
1 −
r−φ
b rt if b rt > r − φ
(8)
Proof: The capitalists get a return of r − φ from foreign investment. Suppose b rt < r − φ. From (6),
the domestic supply of capital is given by Kt =
h
(1−τt)γA
r−φ
i 1
1−γ Ht. The income of the worker is
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]
·
(1 − τt)γ
r − φ
¸ γ
1−γ
A
1
1−γHt.
The tax rate that maximizes [(1 − γ)+τtγ][(1 − τt)γ]
γ
1−γ will also maximize the worker’s income.
Maximizing the expression, [(1 − γ)+τtγ][(1 − τt)γ]
γ
1−γ, with respect to τ implies that the optimal
tax rate is zero. If b rt > r − φ, the workers will set a tax rate up to a point where the capitalist
is indiﬀerent between investing at home or abroad. Hence, the tax rate that maximizes a worker’s
income is given by the following condition:
b rt(1 − τt)=r − φ.
Note that Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium tax rate is given by,
τt =m a x {0,1 −
r − φ
b rt
}.
10with domestic investment given by,
Kt =



h
γA
r−φ
i 1
1−γ eθ
t−1 if b rt ≤ r − φ
bK
t−1 if b rt > r − φ
.
If b rt ≤ r − φ,t h eo p t i m a lt a xf o rt h ew o r k e r si s0 and we have an interior solution to the capitalist’s
allocation problem between domestic and foreign investment, i.e., maximization of equation (5) with
respect to Kt.I fb rt > r − φ, we get a corner solution: the workers tax the diﬀerence between b rt and
r − φ.F i n a l l y ,w er u l eo u tt h ec a s et h a tr − φ =0 .I fr − φ =0 , then the capitalists have no other
option apart from investing at home. Accordingly, workers simply tax capital income entirely, and the
economy has zero capital stock from the next period onwards. Since this is an uninteresting case, we
assume that, r − φ > 0.14
In the appendix, we show that the optimal tax rate characterized by Proposition 1 holds for any
neo-classical technology that is constant returns to scale in K and H. Hence, the optimal tax results -
and the dynamics that fellow - are robust to any neo-classical technology that exhibits constant returns
to scale in the assumed factor inputs. This fully characterizes the tax rate and the composition of
investment in equilibrium.15
Figure 2 summarizes the tax chosen by the workers and the resulting investment behavior of the
capitalists. Figure 2a shows that the amount of capital ﬂight in an interior equilibrium. In Figure 2a,
the marginal product of capital schedule intersects the world interest rate r − φ and keeps falling so
that b rt is less than r−φ. In this case the optimal tax for the workers is zero. The point of intersection
between the rt schedule and r − φ gives us the amount of domestic investment and capital ﬂight.
In Figure 2b, the rt schedule is decreasing but b rt exceeds the world interest rate, r − φ.I n t h i s
case the workers will tax capital until the capitalists are just indiﬀerent between investing at home or
abroad. Ex-post, this implies rt(1 − τt)=r − φ and there is no capital ﬂi g h t .N o t et h a tF i g u r e2 b
shows the optimal tax behavior of the worker in the case of a corner equilibrium.
Insert Figure 2a and 2b Here.
14We later state a regularity condition to ensure that the capitalist’s endowment doesn’t converge to zero.
15If foreign and domestic capital are perfect substitutes - as in the current setup - then there will be no capital inﬂows
when the domestic interest rate is low. This happens in the current framework when an interior solution with zero
taxation obtains in equilibrium. When the domestic interest rate is high, a corner equilibrium obtains in which workers
tax the capitalists to keep the capitalists just indiﬀerent between investing domestically and investing abroad. Hence,
allowing capital inﬂows does not change Proposition 1. To keep the model tractable, we therefore rule out capital inﬂows
in the subsequent analysis.
113 The Dynamic Evolution of Education and Capital
In this section, we characterize the transitional dynamics and the steady state behavior of the economy.
We show that whether balanced growth obtains depends on whether θ =1 ,o rθ < 1, respectively. We
also derive an endogenous threshold relating the technology parameter, “A”, to the capital control
parameter, φ. The endogenous threshold determines whether the worker’s income and human capital
accumulation matches the growth in income of the capitalists and the accumulation of capital. Im-
portantly, we show that capital controls can lead to a higher growth in education if the economy is at
al o w e rl e v e lo fd e v e l o p m e n t .
3.1 θ =1
We ﬁrst consider the case where θ =1 . The capitalist’s income in equilibrium is given by yK
t =
(r − φ)bK
t−1, irrespective of whether b rt is less than or greater than r − φ. The capitalist’s capital
endowment grows at the rate
gK =
bK
t
bK
t−1
=( 1− α)(r − φ). (9)
The income of workers is given by,
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]AK
γ
t H
1−γ
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]AK
γ
t e
θ(1−γ)
t−1
=[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]AK
γ
t eδ
t−1.
where δ = θ(1 − γ). From Proposition 1, the evolution of education is given by
et =
(
(1 − α)(1 − γ)
h
γ
r−φ
i γ
1−γ A
1
1−γeθ
t−1 if b rt ≤ r − φ
(1 − α)[(1 − γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)δ if b rt > r − φ.
(10)
It is clear from equation (9) that the dynamics of the evolution of capital does not depend on the
parameter θ. However, the evolution of education given by equation (10) depends on the value of the
parameter, θ. To ensure that the capitalist’s endowment grows over time, we require the regularity
condition: (1 − α)(r − φ) > 1.16 This implies that the capitalist’s endowment of capital grows at a
constant rate if the economy does not have any capital controls in place.
Since θ =1 , from (10), the evolution of education is given by,
et =
(
(1 − α)(1 − γ)
h
γ
r−φ
i γ
1−γ A
1
1−γet−1 if b rt ≤ r − φ
(1 − α)[(1 − γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)1−γ if b rt > r − φ.
(11)
16We can also think of this as an upper bound on the extent of capital controls, i.e., φ ≤ r − (1 − α)
−1.
12The next proposition summarizes the steady state equilibrium growth rate of education in comparison
to the growth rate of capital.
Proposition 2 Let ge and gK denote the (gross) growth rates of education and capital, respectively.
Deﬁne A(φ) as
A(φ)=
r − φ
(1 − γ)1−γγγ.
If A ≥ A(φ) there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium where ge = gK =( 1− α)(r − φ). If
A<A (φ) then in the steady state, gK >g e.
Proof: Deﬁne the critical value of the capital-education ratio that yields an interior solution as
c bK
e =(
γA
r−φ)
1
1−γ.N o t e t h a t i f
bK
t
e ≤ c bK
e , a corner solution obtains. For a corner equilibrium, from
Proposition 1 and equation (11), we know that the growth rate of education is given by,
ge =
et
et−1
=( 1− α)


1 −
r − φ
γA
³
bK
t−1
et−1
´γ−1γ


A
Ã
bK
t−1
et−1
!γ
ge =( 1− α)
"
A
Ã
bK
t−1
et−1
!γ
− (r − φ)
Ã
bK
t−1
et−1
!#
.
Note that argmax
(bK
e )
ge = c bK
e . This implies that the maximum growth rate with a corner solution for,
g∗
e,i sg i v e nb y 17:
g∗
e =( 1− α)(1 − γ)A
1
1−γ(
γ
r − φ
)
γ
1−γ
Now we look at the case of an interior equilibrium. If
bK
t
e > c bK
e , equation (11) implies that
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fe d u c a t i o ni sg i v e nb y ,g∗
e =( 1− α)(1 − γ)
h
γ
r−φ
i γ
1−γ A
1
1−γ. From equation (9),
gK =( 1− α)(r − φ).L e tA(φ) be the level of technological parameter where this condition, g∗
e = gK,
holds with equality, i.e.,
A(φ)=
r − φ
(1 − γ)1−γγγ.
In the steady state, if A<A (φ), ge <g K: i.e., there will always be capital ﬂight and the growth rate
of education will be strictly less than the growth rate of capital. However, if A ≥ A(φ),t h e r ee x i s t sa
unique (bK
e ) ratio such that ge = gK =( 1−α)(r−φ): i.e., in the steady state, there will be no capital
ﬂight.
ge =



(1 − α)[A
³
bK
t−1
et−1
´γ
− (r − φ)
³
bK
t−1
et−1
´
], if bK
e ≤ (
γA
r−φ)
1
1−γ(corner)
(1 − α)(1 − γ)A
1
1−γ(
γ
r−φ)
γ
1−γ, if bK
e > (
γA
r−φ)
1
1−γ(interior)
(12)
17We assume that A is suﬃciently large, i.e., A ≥
1
[(1−α)(r−φ)]1−γ A(φ), to ensure that worker income grows over time.
Since (1 − α)(r − φ) > 1, this is satisiﬁed if A ≥ A(φ).
13Equation (12) gives us the growth rate of education as a function of the capital education ratio.
The possible scenarios of steady state growth are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b.
Insert Figure 3a and Figure 3b Here.
Figure 3a shows the steady state equilibrium when A>A (φ). The growth rate of education is an
increasing function of capital-education ratio. It reaches a maximum at b b
e after which it becomes
constant as we have capital ﬂight. The growth rate of capital is always equal to: (1−α)(r−φ).W h e n
A>A (φ), these two curves intersect at a unique capital-education ratio, b
e. If the initial ratio, b0
e0 < b
e,
then the capital-education ratio, b
e,w i l li n c r e a s e .I fb0
e0 > b
e, then the capital-education ratio, b
e,f a l l s .
This implies that the steady state equilibrium is unique and stable with both capital and education
growing at the same rate. In the steady state, we always have a corner solution with no capital ﬂight.
Figure 3b shows the steady state equilibrium when A<A (φ). Irrespective of the initial capital -
education ratio, b0
e0, the growth rate of education never catches up with the growth rate of the capital
stock. Eventually the domestic rental rate falls to a point where there is capital ﬂight. This leads to
unbalanced growth: i.e., to a situation in which gK >g e in the steady state. If we interpret the b
e
ratio as a measure of inequality, then in steady state inequality keeps increasing. The income of the
capitalists in comparison to the income of the workers also keeps increasing forever.
Proposition 2 suggests that capital controls are good for an economy when the level of technology
is very low. However, when technology reaches a certain threshold capital controls can be harmful
for growth. To see this intuitively, consider the case where A>A (φ), under which the worker’s
optimal tax is a corner equilibrium (in terms of Figure 2b). When φ rises (capital controls rise) the
worker’s optimal tax on capital income increases. This lowers the after-tax income of capitalists in the
next period and leads to lower domestic investment, K, as well as a reduction in the growth rate of
capital, gK. This reduces steady state wages and the income of workers, leading to lower investment
in education. Therefore, a rise in φ leads to a lower capital-education ratio as well as lower equilibrium
growth rates of education and capital. As such, a reduction in φ as long as A>A (φ) facilitates the
transition to the high equilibrium growth rate. This is because the level of technology is suﬃcient
to sustain balanced growth, implying that developed countries do not require capital controls. This
is consistent with recent evidence in Bekaert (2000) who show that while ﬁnancial liberalizations are
associated with signiﬁcant increases in economic growth, the eﬀect is larger for countries with high
education levels.
When A<A (φ), an interior equilibrium obtains and the optimal tax set by workers is zero. A
rise in φ has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, it reduces capital ﬂight which increases the domestic capital stock and
14wages, leading to higher income for the workers. This leads to more investment in education as well
as a higher growth rate of education, ge (even though ge <g K). Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of a change
in φ on the gK and ge curves. Note that A(φ) is falling in φ.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a r i s e i n φ reduces
the threshold required to jump to the balanced growth equilibrium. Increasing capital controls when
a country is underdeveloped may be good, as it relaxes the constraint required to achieve the high
growth equilibrium.
Insert Figure 4 Here.
Interestingly, in an interior equilibrium, the channel through which capital controls aﬀects growth is
not through the equilibrium tax rate. This is because the optimal taxes for workers are zero. A change
in φ only aﬀects the proportion of the capitalist’s endowment invested domestically and abroad. This
aﬀects the wages of workers and their income which leads to changes in investment in education.
Importantly, the channels through which changes in φ aﬀect equilibrium growth depends on whether
ac o r n e ro ri n t e r i o re q u i l i b r i u mo b t a i n si ns t e a d ys t a t e .
3.2 θ < 1
We now consider the case where human capital is concave with respect to investment in education
i.e., θ < 1. The results are summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Given any initial endowment of capital, bK
0 , and education, e0, there exists a time period
t0 such that b rt < r − φ for all t ≥ t0.
Proof: We show that in the steady state there is some capital ﬂight even if the economy starts oﬀ
from a point where the domestic pre-tax rental rate exceeds the return from foreign investment for
the capitalists. From equation (10), the evolution of education is given by
et =( 1− α)[(1 − γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)δ if b rt > r − φ.
From Proposition 1, we know that the optimal tax rate on rental income is given by, τt =1−
r−φ
b rt .
Using (7) and (10), we can write the evolution of education as
et =( 1− α)[A(bK
t−1)γ(et−1)δ − (r − φ)bK
t−1].
Accordingly, the growth rate of education is given by
ge =
et
et−1
=( 1− α)[A(
bK
t−1
et−1
)γe
(θ−1)(1−γ)
t−1 − (r − φ)(
bK
t−1
et−1
)].
When the growth rate of education, ge, exceeds growth rate of domestic capital, (1 − α)(r − φ),
the capital-education ratio, bK
e , falls in the next period. In addition, the term e
(θ−1)(1−γ)
t−1 → 0 if
15ge > (1−α)(r −φ). Hence, in the steady state, ge < (1−α)(r −φ), which implies, b rt = γ
µ
eθ
t−1
bK
t−1
¶1−γ
,
is monotonically decreasing over time. Hence, there exits a t0 such that b rt < r − φ for all t ≥ t0.
Lemma 2 says that irrespective of whether the initial world interest rate is less or greater than the
initial domestic interest rate, an interior equilibrium obtains in the steady state in which optimal taxes
are zero. Hence, when human capital is concave with respect to investment in education, an interior
equilibrium obtains with a unique constant steady state level of education. In the next proposition,
we characterize the unique steady state level of investment in education.
Proposition 3 In the steady state, the unique constant steady state level of education is given by,
e∗ =
(
(1 − α)(1 − γ)A
1
1−γ
·
γ
r − φ
¸ γ
1−γ
) 1
1−θ
,
and is independent of the initial endowments.
Proof: From Lemma 2, it follows that the economy eventually reaches a point when b rt < r−φ.F r o m
(10), the evolution of education is given by
et =( 1− α)(1 − γ)A
1
1−γ
·
γ
r − φ
¸ γ
1−γ
eθ
t−1 .
Education in period t is a monotonically increasing concave function of the previous period’s education.
In the steady state, et = et−1 = e∗. Hence, the steady state level of education is
e∗ =
(
(1 − α)(1 − γ)A
1
1−γ
·
γ
r − φ
¸ γ
1−γ
) 1
1−θ
.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 operates similar to the case where θ =1and A<A (φ) where
ar i s ei nφ induces a growth eﬀect on the growth rate of education. Here a rise in φ has a level eﬀect
with the steady state equilibrium growth rate being zero. To see this, suppose there is an increase
in φ. Since the unique steady state equilibrium level of income is at an interior point, this implies
that the optimal tax for workers is zero.18 Therefore, a rise in φ raises domestic investment, K,b y
the capitalists, and induces lesser capital ﬂight. Since the domestic stock of capital increases, workers
wage incomes increase leading to more investment in education. Hence, a higher φ - or more capital
controls - lead to greater investment in education. Figure (5) depicts this. Starting at e∗,ah i g h e rφ
moves the steady state to e∗∗.
Insert Figure 5 Here.
18In the steady state, the expression for worker’s income is given by y
W = wh =( 1− γ)
h
γ
r−φ
i γ
1−γ e
∗θ .
16Finally, our model can easily be extended to allow for the possibility of regime changes between
the capitalists and workers. Consider the case where the workers have already set a tax rate, and
a capitalist government comes to power. Suppose the capitalist government can change the capital
control regime: i.e., set φ,g i v e nτ. From equation (9), we know that the workers set the tax rate such
that the capitalist’s make a return just equal to r − φ. This means that the capitalists are always
better oﬀ by liberalizing the capital account: that is, set φ =0 . From Figure 5, we know that as
φ falls, there is a sudden decline in investment in education, and the economy converges to a lower
steady state equilibrium. This holds for both the case where θ < 1 as well as θ =1with A<A (φ).
Even in the case θ =1with A<A (φ),as u ﬃciently large reduction in φ -b e c a u s eA(φ) is decreasing
in φ - would move the economy to an unbalanced growth equilibrium. Capital account liberalization
yields the high growth equilibrium provided that the economy is suﬃciently developed.
4 The Model with Subsistence Production
In this section we augment the model by introducing a subsistence production technology for the
workers. The presence of a subsistence technology gives the workers an outside option similar to the
outside option for capitalists, the return capitalists receive from investing abroad. We have seen in
the previous section that income of the workers and human capital will have perpetual growth only
when θ =1 . Since this is a more interesting case, we will assume that this condition holds.
At the end of each time period t−1, the government which is controlled by the workers announces
a capital tax rate for period t, τt. The workers and capitalists play a simultaneous move game where
the workers choose how much of their bequest is to be invested in education while the capitalists
decide how much to invest at home. We know that maximizing utility by workers and capitalists is
equivalent to maximizing their income. In the presence of a subsistence technology a worker solves
the following problem:
max
et−1
yW
t = wtet−1 + τtrtKt + f(bW
t−1 − et−1), (13)
where f(.) denotes the subsistence sector technology, and (bW
t−1 − et−1) is the amount of workers’
endowment invested in the subsistence sector. In the subsequent analysis we assume the following
functional form for f(.)19:
f(bW
t−1 − et−1)=( bW
t−1 − et−1)1−γ.
19The assumption of this functional form greatly simpliﬁes the algebra and allows us to derive explict solutions for all
the variables of interest. The results will hold qualitatively if the subsistence technology f(.) was increasing and concave
in its argument.
17Maximizing (13) with respect to education implies
wt =( 1− γ)(bW
t−1 − et−1)−γ,
i.e., the workers invest in education until the returns from subsistence production equals the wage
rate. Substituting for the wage rate gives us
(1 − γ)AK
γ
t e
−γ
t−1 =( 1− γ)(bW
t−1 − et−1)−γ, (14)
which after some manipulation can be written as,
et−1 =
"
A
1
γKt
1+A
1
γKt
#
bW
t−1. (15)
Equation (15) denotes the reaction function of the workers. It tells us that as domestic investment by
the capitalists increases, workers will invest more in education. The proportion of their bequest, bW
t−1,
invested in education is increasing in domestic investment level, Kt.
The problem faced by the capitalist is the same as before. The domestic investment by capitalists
is given by
Kt =

 
 
0 if rt(1 − τt) < r − φ
h
(1−τt)γA
r−φ
i 1
1−γ et−1 if rt(1 − τt)=r − φ
bK
t−1 if rt(1 − τt) > r − φ
(16)
For any domestic investment to take place , the net domestic return, rt(1 − τt), must be suﬃciently
high. When rt(1 − τt)=r − φ, domestic investment is increasing in education. As it turns out, this
will be the only scenario we need to consider as the workers will always ﬁnd it optimal to increase the
tax rate on capital when, rt(1 − τt) > r − φ, holds. This implies,
Kt =
·
(1 − τt)γA
r − φ
¸ 1
1−γ
et−1,
which we write as,
et−1 =
·
r − φ
(1 − τt)γA
¸ 1
1−γ
Kt. (17)
Equation (17) is the reaction function of the capitalists. Figure 6 shows the reaction functions of
the workers and the capitalists. The workers reaction function labeled as WW. It is increasing and
concave in domestic capital, Kt. The capitalists reaction function is labeled as KK.I ti sl i n e a ra n d
increasing until Kt <b K
t−1, after which it becomes a vertical line. The intersection between these two
18curves gives us the equilibrium levels of domestic investment and education level in each time period
t.
Insert Figure 6 Here
Let us denote the equilibrium domestic investment by K∗
t and domestic education as e∗
t−1.N o t i c e
K∗
t =0and e∗
t−1 =0is always a Nash equilibrium. However, the more interesting equilibrium is
when the KK and the WW curves intersect at some K∗
t > 0 and e∗
t−1 > 0. This equilibrium can be
inﬂuenced by the tax rate set by the workers and the capital control regime in place.
Lemma 3 Let B =
r−φ
(1−τt)γA. If bW
t−1 < B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
,then K∗
t =0and e∗
t−1 =0is the only Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider equation (15). Taking the derivative with respect to Kt we get the slope of the
workers reaction i.e.,
det−1
dKt
=
bW
t−1A
1
γ
(1 + A
1
γKt)2
Note that
det−1
dKt is decreasing in Kt.A sKt → 0 the slope of the workers reaction function reaches its
maximum value bW
t−1A
1
γ. The slope of the capitalists reaction function is given by
h
r−φ
(1−τt)γA
i 1
1−γ ,or,
B
1
1−γ. Hence, if bW
t−1A
1
γ <B
1
1−γ ⇐⇒ bW
t−1 < B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
, the only possible equilibrium is K∗
t =0and
e∗
t−1 =0 .
This is shown in Figure 7a when the WW curve lies below the KK curve. The entire endowment
of the workers is invested in subsistence production while the capitalists invest their entire endowment
abroad. The modern sector — corresponding to positive levels of education — in the economy does not
exist. This gives us a lower bound on the workers endowment, i.e.,
bW
t−1 ≥ bW =
·
r − φ
γA
¸ 1
1−γ ·
1
A
¸
1
γ
(18)
for the existence of the modern sector in the economy and the workers tax problem to be meaningful.
Notice that the threshold bW needed for the existence of the modern sector is increasing in (r−φ) and
decreasing in A.I f ,bW
t−1 ≥ bW, t h e r ew i l lb eaN a s he q u i l i b r i u mw h e r eb o t hK∗
t and e∗
t−1 are positive.
This is because higher capital controls leads to higher domestic investment leading to higher worker
income, and subsequently higher investment in education by workers. Hence, higher capital controls
make it possible for a modern sector to exist. In the next proposition, we characterize the levels of
education investment and domestic investment that obtain in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 7A Here
19Proposition 4 If bW
t−1 > B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
, the equilibrium domestic capital and education are given by
K∗
t =m i n
(
bW
t−1
B
1
1−γ
−
1
A
1
γ
,b K
t−1
)
,e ∗
t−1 =m i n
(
B
1
1−γK∗
t ,
Ã
A
1
γK∗
t
1+A
1
γK∗
t
!
bW
t−1
)
,
Proof: If bW
t−1 > B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
we know that the slope of the workers reaction function will exceed the slope
of the capitalists reaction function at Kt =0 . Hence there will exist a unique Nash equilibrium where
the WW curve and KK curves intersect. From equations (15) and (17) the equilibrium will be at
ap o i n tw h e n
h
r−φ
(1−τt)γA
i 1
1−γ Kt =
·
A
1
γ Kt
1+A
1
γ Kt
¸
bW
t−1, or, B
1
1−γKt =
·
A
1
γ Kt
1+A
1
γ Kt
¸
bW
t−1.S o l v i n g f o r Kt we
obtain: B
1
1−γ(1 + A
1
γKt)=A
1
γbW
t−1,or B
1
1−γA
1
γKt = A
1
γbW
t−1 − B
1
1−γ ,o r ,K∗
t =
bW
t−1
B
1
1−γ
− 1
A
1
γ
.O f
course, K∗
t cannot exceed bK
t−1.H e n c eK∗
t =m i n
½
bW
t−1
B
1
1−γ
− 1
A
1
γ
,b K
t−1
¾
. Substituting in equation (17)
and (15)we have e∗
t−1 =m i n
½
B
1
1−γK∗
t ,
µ
A
1
γ K∗
t
1+A
1
γ K∗
t
¶
bW
t−1
¾
.
The case where K∗
t = bK
t−1 is depicted in Figure 7b.
Insert Figure 7b Here
4.1 Optimal Tax Rate under Subsistence Production
We now characterize the optimal tax rate for the workers under subsistence production.
Proposition 5 Under subsistence production, the workers set a tax rate such that the capitalist is
indiﬀerent between investing at home or abroad. The optimal tax rate is given by,
τt =
(
0 if K∗
t <b K
t−1
τt =1−
r−φ
b r∗
t if K∗
t = bK
t−1
(19)
where K∗ corresponds to the level of domestic investment under subsistence production, and b r∗
t corre-
sponds to the domestic return to capital when the entire capitalist’s endowment is invested domestically
under subsistence production.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 5 implies that the optimal tax rate under subsistence production is determined under
a similar trade-oﬀ when workers do not invest in the subsistence technology in the previous section.
Intuitively, since human capital and physical capital are complements, more of the former raises
the return that capitalists receive from investing their endowment domestically. This lead to higher
20domestic investment. Therefore, in a corner equilibrium, the workers will tax capitalists up to an
amount that keeps the capitalists indiﬀerent between investing domestically and investing abroad.
Given Proposition 5, we are now in a position to characterize the growth rates of the worker’s and
capitalists endowment.
The endowment of workers evolves according to,
bW
t =( 1− α)yW
t .
When K∗
t <b K
t−1,
bW
t =( 1− α)
(
(1 − γ)γ
γ
1−γA
1
1−γbW
t−1
(r − φ)
γ
1−γ
+
r − φ
A
1
γ
)
.
With subsistence production the growth rate of workers endowment, gW,i sg i v e nb y
bW
t
bW
t−1
= gW =( 1− α)
(
(1 − γ)γ
γ
1−γA
1
1−γ
(r − φ)
γ
1−γ
+
r − φ
bW
t−1A
1
γ
)
. (20)
In case b r∗
t > r − φ income of the workers is given by
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]A(bK
t−1)γ(e∗
t−1)1−γ +
Ã
e∗
t−1
A
1
γKt
!1−γ
.
Substituting for τt and b r∗
t yields,
yW
t = A(bK
t−1)γ(e∗
t−1)1−γ
Ã
1+A
1
γbK
t−1
A
1
γbK
t−1
!
− (r − φ)bK
t−1.
From (15) we know that
e∗
t−1 =
"
A
1
γbK
t−1
1+A
1
γbK
t−1
#
bW
t−1. (21)
Hence,
yW
t =( bW
t−1)1−γ(1 + A
1
γbK
t−1)γ − (r − φ)bK
t−1.
The worker’s endowment grows at the rate
bW
t
bW
t−1
= gW =( 1− α)
(Ã
1+A
1
γbK
t−1
bW
t−1
!γ
− (r − φ)
Ã
bK
t−1
bW
t−1
!)
. (22)
The growth rate of capitalists endowment will remain the same as before i.e.,
gK =( 1− α)(r − φ).
21We have the growth rates for the worker’s endowment when K∗
t <b K
t−1and K∗
t = bK
t−1.W ea r en o wi n
a position to characterize which case will prevail in equilibrium. Note that,
K∗
t <b K
t−1 ⇐⇒
bW
t−1
B
1
1−γ
−
1
A
1
γ
<b K
t−1 ⇐⇒ bW
t−1 <B
1
1−γbK
t−1 +
B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
.
When K∗
t <b K
t−1we know that the tax rate is zero. Substituting for B and using equation (18) we
have
bW
t−1 <
µ
r − φ
γA
¶ 1
1−γ
bK
t−1 +
µ
r − φ
γA
¶ 1
1−γ µ
1
A
1
γ
¶
,
bW
t−1 <
µ
r − φ
γA
¶ 1
1−γ
bK
t−1 + bW.
This implies that when bW
t−1 <
³
r−φ
γA
´ 1
1−γ bK
t−1 + bW the growth rate of the worker’s endowment will
be given by equation (20)
gW =( 1− α)
(
(1 − γ)γ
γ
1−γA
1
1−γ
(r − φ)
γ
1−γ
+
r − φ
bW
t−1A
1
γ
)
. (23)
When bW
t−1 ≥
³
r−φ
γA
´ 1
1−γ bK
t−1 + bW , the growth rate is given by equation (22)
gW =( 1− α)
(Ã
A
1
γ bK
t−1
bW
t−1
+
1
bW
t−1
!γ
− (r − φ)
Ã
bK
t−1
bW
t−1
!)
. (24)
Note that gW ≥ ge irrespective of whether there is capital ﬂight or not. This is because workers
also invest in the subsistence technology. However, since the growth rate of education is greater than
one, as bW
t−1 becomes large gW → ge. The growth rate of workers endowment and education are
asymptotically the same (see equation 12),
gW =( 1− α)
(
A
Ã
bK
t−1
bW
t−1
!γ
− (r − φ)
Ã
bK
t−1
bW
t−1
!)
when K∗
t = bK
t−1, (25)
gW =( 1− α)
(
(1 − γ)γ
γ
1−γA
1
1−γ
(r − φ)
γ
1−γ
)
when K∗
t <b K
t−1. (26)
This is because as capital accumulation proceeds, the amount invested by workers in the subsistence
technology diminishes. In the limit, workers spent their entire endowment on education with no
investment in the subsistence technology. The growth rate of the worker’s endowment also converges
22to the growth rate of education when K is suﬃciently large. This suggests that asymptotically, the
economy with subsistence technology is identical to the economy where workers invest their entire
endowment in education. The dynamics with subsistence technology are analogous to Figures 3b
and 4. By raising domestic investment, higher capital controls raise the growth rate of the worker’s
endowment, gW,and reduce the worker’s share of endowment invested in the subsistence technology.
However, as in the earlier case, in an interior equilibrium with capital ﬂight, the optimal taxes remain
equal to zero. When the capitalists invest their entire endowment domestically, the tax rate on capital
income will be positive, although the subsistence sector vanishes over time with suﬃciently high growth
in worker bequests.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper constructs a heterogenous agent OLG model to study the eﬀect of the capital controls on the
level of investment in human capital and the resulting growth path of an economy. The conventional
wisdom in this literature says that reducing capital controls will curb the ability of the government to
tax capitalists and therefore prove beneﬁcial for growth. We ﬁnd that it is indeed true but only when an
economy is suﬃciently developed and is able to sustain a balanced growth equilibrium in steady state.
When an economy is underdeveloped and experiencing capital ﬂight this argument does not apply.
This result is consistent with a large literature on capital mobility and economic performance which
suggests that an open capital account positively aﬀects growth only after a country has achieved a
certain degree of economic development (Edwards, 2000). Our results are also consistent with recent
evidence in Bekaert et al. (2001) who show that while ﬁnancial liberalizations are associated with
signiﬁcant increases in economic growth, the eﬀect is larger for countries with high education levels.
Finally, we also show that in an interior equilibrium, the capital control regime has no eﬀect on the
tax rates. Instead, they inﬂuence the equilibrium allocation of capital at home or abroad and as a
result, investment in education. Higher capital controls in this environment can prevent excessive
capital ﬂight and help an economy to develop the modern sector. Higher capital controls also relax
the constraint for the existence of balanced growth in a steady state equilibrium.
236A p p e n d i x 1
Consider the production function Y = F(K,H) where F(.) is constant returns to scale in K and
H. Since the indirect utility function of workers is monotonically increasing in the worker’s income,
yW
t = wtHt +τtrtKt, the tax rate that maximizes worker income also maximizes worker utility. Since
the government is represented by the workers, the government solves
max
τt
yW
t = wtHt + τtrtKt,
subject to
Kt ≤ bK
t ,
and
rt(1 − τt) ≥ r − φ.
If Kt ≤ bK
t is binding at τt =0 ,t h e n rt(1−τt) > r−φ. In this case, the optimal tax rate is obtained
from choosing the tax rate that solves, rt(1 − τt)=r − φ. This corresponds to a corner equilibrium
in which there is no capital ﬂight and a positive tax rate. If Kt ≤ bK
t is not binding at τt =0 , then
rt(1−τt) ≥ r −φ holds with equality for all τt ∈ [0,1],i . e . ,rt(1−τt)=r −φ. This can be re-written
as
τtrtKt =[ rt − (r − φ)]Kt.
Substituting the above expression into the objective function implies that,
yW
t = wtHt + τtrtKt
= wtHt + rtKt − (r − φ)Kt,
= F(Kt,H t) − (r − φ)Kt.
Importantly, the expression, F(Kt,H t) − (r − φ)Kt, reaches a maximum with respect to Kt at the
point
FK(Kt,H t)=rt =( r − φ),
24which implies a zero tax rate in equilibrium. This implies that the zero tax result is robust to any
production function that is CRS in K and H.
7A p p e n d i x 2
Let us ﬁrst consider the case K∗
t <b K
t−1. We have already solved for the equilibrium domestic
investment and education. Now we need to derive workers income at the equilibrium. Workers income
in period t is given by
yW
t = wtet−1 + τtrtKt +( bW
t−1 − et−1)1−γ.
From (14),
AK
γ
t e
−γ
t−1 =( bW
t−1 − et−1)−γ,
which implies, (bW
t−1 − et−1)=
et−1
A
1
γ Kt
. We know that in equilibrium, e∗
t−1 = B
1
1−γK∗
t .T h i s i m p l i e s
(bW
t−1 − e∗
t−1)=B
1
1−γ
A
1
γ
. Hence, a workers income from the subsistence sector is given by, (bW
t−1 −
e∗
t−1)1−γ = B
A
1−γ
γ
. Now consider the expression: wtet−1 + τtrtKt =[ ( 1 − γ)+τtγ]AK
γ
t e
1−γ
t−1 =
[(1−γ)+τtγ]A(K∗
t )γ(B
1
1−γK∗
t )1−γ =[ ( 1−γ)+τtγ]ABK∗
t . This allows us to write the workers total
income as,
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]ABK∗
t +
B
A
1−γ
γ
.
Substituting for K∗
t we have
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]AB
(
bW
t−1
B
1
1−γ
−
1
A
1
γ
)
+
B
A
1−γ
γ
,
which after substituting out for the term, B, and simplifying yields,
yW
t =[ ( 1− γ)+τtγ]
A
1
1−γbW
t−1
(r − φ)
γ
1−γ
[(1 − τt)γ]
γ
1−γ +
r − φ
A
1
γ
.
Maximizing yW
t with respect to τ is equivalent to maximizing the expression [(1 − γ)+τtγ][(1 −
τt)γ]
γ
1−γwith respect to τ . We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that the tax rate which maximizes
this expression is 0. Hence the workers will set the capital tax rate equal to zero whenever there is
capital ﬂight in equilibrium i.e., K∗
t <b K
t−1.
Like the previous section when K∗
t = bK
t−1 the workers will set the tax rate on capital so that the
capitalists are just indiﬀerent between investing at home or abroad. Recall our previous deﬁnition of
25b rt = γA
³
et−1
bK
t−1
´1−γ
. With the presence of the subsistence sector et−1 is not equal to bW
t−1 but a function
of bW
t−1 and K∗
t .D e ﬁne b r∗
t as the equilibrium interest rate i.e.,
b r∗
t = γA
µ
e∗
t−1
K∗
t
¶1−γ
.
At the equilibrium K∗
t = bK
t−1 only if b r∗
t > r − φ. Hence, the tax rate set by the workers will be
τt =1−
r − φ
b r∗
t
> 0.
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Figure 2a:  t r ˆ  <  φ − r  
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Figure 2b:  t r ˆ  >  φ − r  
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Figure 3a: Steady State with θ = 1   
A > A(φ ) 
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Figure 3b: Steady State with θ = 1 
A< A(φ ) 
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Figure 4: Change in Capital Controls  φ φ > ′  
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Figure 5: Steady State with θ < 1   
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Figure 7a: No Modern Sector 
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Figure 7b: Positive Taxes 
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